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Abstract—This paper investigates the secure communication
in a two-hop cooperative wireless network, where a buffer-
aided relay is utilized to forward data from the source to
destination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to intercept
data transmission from both the source and relay. Depending
on the availability of instantaneous channel state information of
the source, two cases of transmission mechanisms, i.e., adaptive-
rate transmission and fixed-rate transmission are considered. To
enhance the security of the system, novel link selection policies
are proposed for both cases to select source-to-relay, relay-
to destination, or no link transmission based on the channels
qualities. Closed-form expressions are derived for the end-to-end
secrecy outage probability (SOP), secrecy outage capacity (SOC),
and exact secrecy throughput (EST), respectively. Furthermore,
we prove the condition that EST reaches its maximum, and
explore how to minimize the SOP and maximize the SOC by
optimizing the link selection parameters. Finally, simulations
are conducted to demonstrate the validity of our theoretical
performance evaluation, and extensive numerical results are
provided to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed link selection
polices for the secure communication in two-hop cooperative
networks.
Index Terms—link selection, secure wireless communication,
cooperative networks, physical layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS communication technologies are the fastestgrowing segment of the telecommunications indus-
try and their rapid developments have been promoting the
evolution into the fifth generation (5G) communication [1].
However, due to the broadcast nature of wireless mediums,
communication over wireless networks is susceptible to the
interception attacks of unintended recipients (i.e., eavesdrop-
pers). Therefore, guaranteeing the security of wireless commu-
nication networks is becoming an increasingly urgent demand
[2].
Traditionally, data is secured by applying the key-based
enciphering (cryptographic) techniques in the upper layers of
the network protocol stack [3]. Although these cryptographic
methods have shown their effectiveness in wired networks,
the inherent difficulty of secret key distribution/management
without centralized control and complex encryption algorithms
may significantly limit their applications in decentralized wire-
less networks [4]. This motivates the introduction of physical
layer (PHY) security technology recently as the complemen-
tary approach to further enhancing the secrecy in wireless
communications [5]. The philosophy behind PHY security is
to exploit the natural randomness of noise and the physical
characteristics of wireless channels (like fading) to provide
information-theoretic security, which has been regarded as
the strongest form of security irrespective of the computing
capabilities of eavesdroppers [6]–[8]. Thus, PHY security tech-
niques are highly promising to guarantee everlasting secure
communication for wireless networks [9]–[11].
The seminal work [12] by Wyner introduced the wiretap
channel model as a basic framework for the PHY security
which was laid down by Shannon’s definition of perfect
secrecy in [13]. Subsequently, many research activities have
been devoted to the study of PHY security under other
channel models, such as non-degrade channel [14], Gaussian
channel [15], multi-antenna channel [16] and relay channel
[17]. Motivated by these early studies, diverse approaches for
improving PHY security have been proposed in the literature,
which mainly include channel precoding/beamforming [18]–
[20], cooperative jamming [21], [22], channel coding [23], [24]
and link/relay selection [25]–[27].
This paper focuses on the link/relay selection for securing
the communication in wireless cooperative networks. The
main advantage of link/relay selection is the implementation
simplicity, as the sophisticated transmission techniques or
explicit synchronization process is not required. Inspired by
the pioneering work [25] which analyzes the fundamental
benefits can be achieved by link/relay selection, extensive
studies have been conducted to design efficient relay/link
selection schemes under various network scenarios, such as
max-min-ratio scheme [26], AFbORS and DFbORS schemes
[27]. Recently, the adoption of buffer-aided relaying has been
proved that it can improve the cooperative communication
performance in terms of throughput and diversity gains [28],
[29]. Different from the conventional relaying scheduling,
buffer-aided relaying exploits the flexibility offered by the
buffer and enables the data transmission to be executed under
favorable channel conditions.
Following this line, some initial selection schemes with
buffer-aided relaying have been proposed for the secure
communication in wireless cooperative networks [30]–[34].
Specifically, Chen et al. [30] put forward the max-ratio (MR)
selection scheme for half-duplex decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying networks. MR scheme activates the link with the
largest channel gain ratio based on the knowledge of both
legitimate and wiretap channel state information (CSI), such
that it can achieve a better secrecy performance than the
conventional max-min-ratio scheme [26]. Taking into account
the transmission efficiency and security constraint, Huang et
al. [31] designed a link selection scheme in a two-hop DF relay
network to achieve tradeoff between secrecy throughput and
secrecy outage probability. The network scenario with multiple
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2antennas and multiple eavesdroppers was further explored
in [32], where a maximum likelihood (ML) criterion-based
algorithm is proposed to select sets of relays for secure trans-
mission. More recently, an artificial noise injection scheme
and a hybrid half-/full-duplex scheme were investigated in [33]
and [34], respectively, to enhance the physical layer security
in cooperative networks with buffer-aided relaying.
This paper considers a more practical wireless coopera-
tive system which composes one source-destination pair, one
trusted relay with infinite buffer and one passive eavesdropper.
Taking into account the fact that the eavesdropper intercepts
data transmission in a passive way which can be hardly
monitored, we adopt the assumption that the exact instanta-
neous/statistical CSI of the eavesdropping channel is unavail-
able, reflecting the more realistic scenario than those assumed
in the aforementioned works. Moreover, in contrast to [31]
where only the relay-to-destination channel is wiretapped, we
consider a more hazardous and more practical eavesdropping
scenario that the eavesdropper overhears data transmission
from both the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links
in order to intercept the confidential information with a
higher probability. Therefore, to ensure the end-to-end secure
communication in wireless cooperative networks, novel link
selection schemes should be redesigned, which motivates the
conducting of this study. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
• Depending on the availability of instantaneous channel
state information at the source, two cases of transmission
mechanisms, i.e., adaptive-rate transmission and fixed-
rate transmission are considered. We design link selection
policies to ensure the communication security for both
cases. Particularly, according to the qualities of legitimate
channels, the policies fully utilize the flexibility provided
by buffer-aided relaying to select source-to-relay, relay-
to-destination, or no link transmission, which are different
from the conventional on-off schemes.
• For the proposed link selection policies, closed-form ex-
pressions of end-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP),
secrecy outage capacity (SOC) and exact secrecy through-
put (EST) are derived, respectively. We further prove the
condition that EST reaches its maximum, and explore
how to minimize the SOP and maximize the SOC by
optimizing the link selection parameters.
• We conduct simulations to demonstrate the validity of
theoretical performance evaluation, and provide extensive
numerical results to illustrate the efficiency of the pro-
posed link selection polices for the secure communication
in wireless cooperative networks.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the system models and necessary definitions.
Section III elaborates the design of link selection policies un-
der the adaptive-rate and fixed-rate transmission mechanisms,
respectively. The general problem formulations are presented
in Section IV Section V conducts the performance evaluation
and explores the performance optimization issues We provide
simulation and numerical results in Section VI and finally
concludes this paper in Section VII.
Alice Relay Bob
Eve
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Fig. 1. Illustration of system models.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce the system models and some
definitions involved in this study.
A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a two-hop wireless cooper-
ative network which consists of a source (Alice), a destination
(Bob), a relay (Relay) and a passive eavesdropper (Eve). We
assume that there is no direct link from Alice to Bob so that the
messages from Alice can be delivered to Bob only via Relay.
Relay is equipped with infinite buffer to temporarily store the
messages from Alice and operates in the half-duplex mode,
thus it can not transmit and receive simultaneously. Moreover,
we apply the randomize-and-forward (RF) strategy [35], with
which Relay decodes the original signal from Alice and store
the message in its buffer, later it forwards the message to Bob
by transmitting independent randomization signal. We assume
that Alice and Relay transmit messages with fixed power Pa
and Pr, respectively. Eve attempts to intercept signals from
both Alice and Relay, but it cannot combine signals of the
two hops with combining techniques such as MRC [36], [37]
due to the RF strategy.
B. Wireless Channel Model
We consider a time-slotted system where the time is divided
into successive slots with equal duration. All wireless links
are characterized by the quasi-static Rayleigh block fading
such that the channel fading coefficient of each link remains
constant during one time slot, but changes independently and
randomly from one time slot to the next. We use hi,j [k] to
denote the fading coefficient from node i to node j at time
slot k, where i ∈ {a, r} and j ∈ {r, b, e} (here a, r, b, e are
short for Alice, Relay, Bob and Eve, respectively). With the
quasi-static Rayleigh block fading model, the channel gain of a
link is independently and exponentially distributed with mean
E{|hi,j [k]|2} = Ωi,j , where E{·} is the expectation operator.
In addition, complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is
imposed on each link and its variance at Relay, Bob and Eve
are δ2r , δ
2
b and δ
2
e , respectively. Therefore, the instantaneous
3signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) γi,j [k] of a link at time slot k is
determined as
γi,j [k] =
Pi
δ2j
|hi,j [k]|2. (1)
γi,j [k] is also exponentially distributed with the probability
density function (p.d.f) given by
fγi,j [k](x) =
1
γ¯i,j
exp
(
− x
γ¯i,j
)
, x ≥ 0, (2)
where γ¯i,j = Piδ2j Ωi,j . Considering the fact that Eve is a passive
eavesdropper, the instantaneous CSIs from Alice and Relay to
Eve, i.e., ha,e[k] and hr,e[k], are unavailable. Moreover, in this
study we assume that Relay always knows the instantaneous
CSI at Bob while Alice may or may not know the instanta-
neous CSI at Relay, as explained later.
C. Transmission Mechanism
To guarantee the secrecy transmission, we employ the well-
known Wyner’s encoding scheme [12]. When a transmission
is conducted, the transmitter (Alice or Relay) chooses two
rates, one is the rate of transmitted codewords, another is the
rate of confidential messages. The difference between the two
rates, i.e., the rate redundancy, reflects the cost of the secrecy
transmission against eavesdropping. Since we consider the
practical scenario that the instantaneous/statistical CSI of the
wiretap channel is unknown, the transmitter cannot determine
the cost needed to prevent eavesdropping. As a result, in our
transmission mechanism, Alice and Relay set a fix rate for the
confidential messages, denoted as Rs.
Regarding the transmission from Alice to Relay, we con-
sider two cases, i.e., Alice knows and does not know the
corresponding instantaneous CSI (the availability of instan-
taneous CSI at Alice is dependent on the link selection policy
adopted, as explained in Section III). For the former case,
Alice adaptively adjusts the codeword rate to be arbitrarily
close to the channel capacity [38], termed as adaptive-rate
transmission. Thus, when Alice-to-Relay link is selected in
time slot k, the transmission rate of codewords Ra,r[k] is
determined as
Ra,r[k] = log2(1 + γa,r[k]). (3)
For the case that Alice does not know the instantaneous CSI,
when Alice-to-Relay link is selected, it sets a fix rate Ra
(Ra ≥ Rs) to transmit the codewords, termed as fixed-rate
transmission.
Regarding the transmission from Relay to Bob, Relay al-
ways knows the corresponding instantaneous CSI based on the
link selection policies as introduced later. Thus, when Relay-
to-Bob link is selected in time slot k, the transmission rate of
codewords Rr,b[k] is determined as
Rr,b[k] = log2(1 + γr,b[k]). (4)
We use Qr[k−1] to denote the amount of confidential data
(in bits) stored in the buffer of Relay at the end of time slot
k − 1. Then, the evolution of data stored in Relay’s buffer at
Stage 1 Alice Relay Bob
Stage 2
Stage 3
Alice
Alice
Relay
Relay
Bob
Bob
Pilot Decision Signal Messgae
Message transmissionPilot transmission
Fig. 2. Illustration of overall scheduling in a time slot.
the next time slot can be characterized as1
Qr[k] =

Qr[k − 1] +Rs, Alice-to-Relay is selected
{Qr[k − 1]−Rs}+, Relay-to-Bob is selected
Qr[k − 1], No link is selected
(5)
where {x}+ = max{x, 0}.
Remark 1: As introduced in the next section, our link
selection polices can guarantee that the rate of codewords is
always no less than the rate of confidential messages Rs. More
specifically, when Alice-to-Relay link is selected in time slot
k and the adaptive-rate transmission is adopted, Ra,r[k] ≥ Rs
always satisfies; when Relay-to-Bob link is selected in time
slot k, Rr,b[k] ≥ Rs always satisfies.
III. LINK SELECTION POLICIES
In this section, we first present the overall scheduling in a
time slot, and then detail the link selection policies.
A. Overall Scheduling
Regarding the overall scheduling in a time slot, in order
to ensure the transmission security and avoid channel outage
[38], we first need to estimate the instantaneous CSIs of
legitimate links. Then, link selection is made based on our new
policies. Finally, the system conducts transmission operation
or remains idle according to the selection decision. Therefore,
the overall scheduling consists of the following three stages
and can be illustrated in Fig. 2.
Stage 1 (CSI Estimation)
Alice and Bob transmit the pilot sequences to Relay in
turn. By assuming that the reciprocity property [39] of
antenna holds, Relay can estimate the CSIs of Alice-
to-Relay and Relay-to-Bob links, respectively.
Stage 2 (Link Selection)
With the CSIs of two links, Relay acts as the ‘central
node’ to make link selection decision based on some
policies. According to whether Relay feed back the
CSI to Alice, we consider the following two cases.
1It should be noted that after decoding the signal from Alice, Relay only
stores the useful data, i.e., the confidential messages, in its buffer.
4a) With CSI feedback: Relay makes link selection
decision based on the policy described in Sec-
tion III-B. If Alice-to-Relay link is selected,
Relay sends the decision signal and feeds back
the CSI to Alice.
b) Without CSI feedback: Relay makes link selec-
tion decision based on the policy described in
Section III-C. If Alice-to-Relay link is selected,
Relay sends the decision signal to Alice.
Stage 3 (Message Transmission)
Based on the link selection decision, Alice or Relay
transmits the message with the transmission mech-
anism introduced in Section II-C, or the system
remains idle.
Remark 2: It is worth noting that the overall scheduling
incurs at most three handshakes before the real message trans-
mission, thus it is low-complexity for the system operation.
B. Link Selection Policy with CSI Feedback
With the existing link selection policies such as [31],
either Alice-to-Relay or Relay-to-Bob link is selected for data
transmission in all time slots. However, since the eavesdropper
Eve intercepts messages from both links, once in a time slot
the channel qualities of both legitimate links are worse than
those of corresponding wiretap links, the transmission security
cannot be ensured no matter which link is selected. Therefore,
a new selection policy with such a consideration should be
carefully designed.
We let Ik be an indicator variable to denote the link decision
in time slot k. Ik = 0 indicates Alice-to-Relay link is selected,
Ik = 1 indicates Relay-to-Bob link is selected, and Ik = −1
indicates the system remains idle in this time slot. We also
introduce two non-negative parameters α and β which serve as
the thresholds for the channel qualities of two legitimate links,
respectively. Specifically, only if the condition γa,r[k] ≥ α
(resp. γr,b[k] ≥ β) satisfies, Alice-to-Relay (resp. Relay-
to-Bob) link can be selected for message transmission, if
γa,r[k] < α and γr,b[k] < β, no link will be selected, which
ensures a high channel quality of the selected link and thus
provides a good security performance. Moreover, in order to
guarantee that the rate of codewords of the selected link can
cover the rate of confidential messages Rs, we set α ≥ 2Rs−1
and β ≥ 2Rs − 1. Finally, when both the legitimate links are
in high channel quality, i.e., γa,r[k] ≥ α and γr,b[k] ≥ β, the
link with a better relative quality will be selected for message
transmission, i.e., Ik = 0 if
γa,r[k]
α ≥ γr,b[k]β and Ik = 1 if
γa,r[k]
α <
γr,b[k]
β . Therefore, our link selection policy with CSI
feedback can be summarized as Algorithm 1.
C. Link Selection Policy without CSI Feedback
Regarding another case that Relay will not feed back the
instantaneous CSI to Alice if Alice-to-Relay link is selected
due to the system complexity concern, instead of adaptively
adjusting the codeword rate to be the channel capacity, Alice
uses a fixed rate Ra to transmit the codewords. Considering
that Ra may be larger than the channel capacity which will
Algorithm 1 Link Selection Policy with CSI Feedback
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of two legitimate link, thresholds α
and β (α ≥ 2Rs − 1 and β ≥ 2Rs − 1);
Ensure:
Link decision indicator Ik, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T};
1: for k = 1; k ≤ T ; k + + do
2: Calculate γa,r[k] and γr,b[k] based on the instantaneous
CSIs;
3: if γa,r[k] ≥ α ∧ γa,r[k]
α
≥ γr,b[k]
β
then
4: Ik = 0;
5: else if γr,b[k] ≥ β ∧ γr,b[k]
β
>
γa,r[k]
α
then
6: Ik = 1;
7: else
8: Ik = −1;
9: end if
10: end for
Algorithm 2 Link Selection Policy without CSI Feedback
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of two legitimate link, thresholds α
and β (α ≥ 2Rs − 1 and β ≥ 2Rs − 1);
Ensure:
Link decision indicator Ik, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T};
1: for k = 1; k ≤ T ; k + + do
2: Calculate γa,r[k] and γr,b[k] based on the instantaneous
CSIs;
3: if γa,r[k] ≥ max{α, 2Ra − 1} then
4: if
γa,r[k]
α
≥ γr,b[k]
β
then
5: Ik = 0;
6: else
7: Ik = 1;
8: end if
9: else if γr,b[k] ≥ β then
10: Ik = 1;
11: else
12: Ik = −1;
13: end if
14: end for
incur the channel outage if Alice conducts the transmission,
in order to avoid the channel outage, Relay should not select
Alice-to-Relay link when it finds that γa,r[k] < 2Ra −1 (even
if γa,r[k] ≥ α). Therefore, our link selection policy without
CSI feedback can be summarized as Algorithm 2.
In order to make a better understanding of our link selection
policy, we illustrate in Fig. 3 the value of Ik in different
SNR regions. We can see from Fig. 3(a) that when we set the
threshold α ≥ 2Ra−1, the value of Ik in different SNR regions
decided by the policy without CSI feedback is the same as that
decided by the policy with CSI feedback. However, if we set
the threshold α < 2Ra − 1, when 2Ra − 1 > γa,r[k] > α,
γr,b[k] > β and
γa,r[k]
α ≥ γr,b[k]β , Relay-to-Bob link will also
be selected to transmit message (i.e., Ik = 1), as shown in the
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Fig. 3. The value of Ik in different SNR regions. (a) α ≥ 2Ra − 1. (b)
α < 2Ra − 1.
triangle area of Fig. 3(b).
IV. GENERAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first derive the general expression for
secrecy outage capacity, end-to-end secrecy outage probability
and exact secrecy throughput, then we formulate the general
optimization problems about these performance metrics.
A. Performance Metrics
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: Differing form the tradition
SOP [7] [40], a better expression for SOP [41] is defined as
the conditional probability that capacity of the wiretap chan-
nels exceeds the rate redundancy under message successful
transmission (i.e., Pso = Pr[Cs+<Rs| message transmission],
where Cs+ = max{0, Ra,r − Ce} ). Expediently, we use
Γa,r[k] and Γr,b[k] as secrecy outage variables in two hops
respectively, which are expressed as
Γa,r[k] =
{
1, Rs > Ra,r[k]− Ca,e[k]
0, otherwise
(6)
Γr,b[k] =
{
1, Rs > Rr,b[k]− Cr,e[k]
0, otherwise.
(7)
Considering there exists two wiretap channels, the system
SOP can be characterized as a combination of the individual
SOP of each hop, and end-to-end SOP is expressed as
ρso , 1− (1− P1so)(1− P2so), (8)
where P1so , Pr[Γa,r[k] = 1|Ik = 0] and P2so , Pr[Γr,b[k] =
1|Ik = 1], which are derived in Section V.
2) Secrecy Outage Capacity: The secrecy outage constraint
throughput (SOCT) is defined as the largest achievable secrecy
rate under end-to-end SOP constraint at destination
Φ = maximum{EIk [Θ(Rs, Ik)]}
s.t. ρso ≤ ν,
(9)
where Θ(Rs, Ik) = Rs when Ik = 1 and Θ(Rs, Ik) = 0
otherwise. Furtherly, the SOCT can be generally rewritten as
Φ = maximum{ lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs}
s.t. ρso ≤ ν.
(10)
3) Secrecy Throughput: The average rate securely and
reliably delivered to the queue of Bob via Relay over multiple
scheduling is defined as the end-to-end secrecy throughput. A
novel formulation (called successful transmission probability
ρsrt in [42]) to characterize the reliability and security levels
of transmission in both two hops oh the buffer-aided relaying
system, which are defined as
ρ1srt = Pr{Ra,r≤Ca,r, Rs≤Ra,r−Ca,e|Ik = 0} (11)
and
ρ2srt = Pr{Rr,b≤Cr,b, Rs≤Rr,b−Cr,e|Ik = 1}. (12)
Using the notation introduced above, the general expression
for the average successful arriving rate τa,r in the buffer queue
of Relay is derived as
τa,r , ρ1srtPr[Ik = 0]min(Rs, Ra,r[k])
Ξ
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γa,r[k])(1− |Ik|)Rs (13)
where Ξ is due to Rs < Ra,r[k] always satisfies when
Γa,r[k] = 0. Similarly, the average successful accepting
rate τr,b (i.e., the secrecy throughput) securely successfully
delivered to Bob can be generally expressed as
τr,b , ρ2srtPr[Ik = 1]min(Rs, Q[k − 1])
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)R
′
s, (14)
where R
′
s = min(Rs, Q[k − 1]).
Note that τa,r ≥ τr,b is valid because of the buffer-aided
relaying protocol and when τa,r > τr,b, the queue of buffer is
said to be unstable or in the absorbing sate according to [40].
In our system, we have following lemma:
Lemma 1: When the secrecy throughput τr,b reached the
maximum, the necessary condition for optimal link selection
policy is that the buffer queue is always at the edge of non-
absorbing (i.e., τa,r = τr,b) and the link selection parameters
α, β are optimal.
Proof: Because the 1 only is an extension of theorem 1
in [40] in our network scene with Relay having three working
states (i.e., accepting, transmitting and idle), we just provide a
brief proof. We denote the set of indices with Ik > 0 by M and
the set of Ik ≤ 0 by M¯ (where A¯ is the complementary set of
set A). Assume that we have a link selection policy resulting
in τa,r > τr,b (i.e., the queue is in the absorbing state). The
policy can always can be improved by moving the indices k in
M¯ to M to to increase the secrecy throughput until τa,r = τr,b
(i.e., the queue is at the edge of non-absorbing), which leads to
an increase of τr,b at the expense of a decrease of τa,r. From
the law of the conservation of flow, we know that both τa,r
and τr,b will decrease if we move the indices α and β further
once the point τa,r = τr,b is reached. Therefore, When the
buffer queue switches form absorbing state to non-absorbing
state, the secrecy throughput exactly reached the maximum
value.
Lemma 2: When the link selection policy is optimal, the
6event Rs > Q[k − 1] can be negligible and the maximum
exact secrecy throughput can be generally written as
τr,b , lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs. (15)
Proof: We denote the set of indices k with Rs ≤ Qr[k−
1] by C and the set of Rs > Qr[k− 1] by C¯. we also denote
the cardinalities of C and C¯ as N −|C¯| and |C¯|, respectively.
Thus, if the queue is absorbing, Rs ≤ Qr[k−1] always holds,
which means |C¯|/N → 0 (N →∞). As a result, the secrecy
outage capacity is
τr,b , lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)R
′
s
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(
∑
k∈C
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs
+
∑
k∈C¯
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Q[k − 1])
= lim
N→∞
N − |C¯|
N
∑
k∈C
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs.
B. General Optimal Formulation
Now we are ready to formulate the general optimal problem.
We respectively derive the optimal link selection policy (i.e.,
optimal α and β) and optimal secrecy rate Rs that the encoders
use for encoding to maximize secrecy outage capacity under
a desired certain outage probability, and minimize SOP under
the desired certain secrecy outage capacity.
The general problem for maximizing the secrecy outage
capacity can be formulated as
P1: max
α,β,Rs
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs
s.t. C1 : ρid ≤ µ
C2 : ρso = 1− (1− P1so)(1− P2so) ≤ ν
C3 : Rs > 0, α > 0, β > 0.
Because the high probability that Relay keeps idle (i.e.,
ρid = Pr[Ik = −1]) leads to the higher delay, constraint C1 is
required. In C2, ν denotes the desired SOP of the system. Note
that C1 and C2 represent two QoS metrics for information
security and delay in cooperative communication, respectively.
Then the optimal problem to minimum the end-to-end SOP
which represents transmission security performance of the
system under secrecy outage capacity constraints, is generally
formulated as following
P2: min
α,β,Rs
ρso = 1− (1− P1so)(1− P2so)
s.t. C1 : ρid ≤ µ
C2 : lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs≥ξ
C3 : Rs > 0, α > 0, β > 0,
where θ is the desired minimum secrecy outage capacity.
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we formulate the optimal
problem about exact secrecy throughput as follow
P3: max
α,β,Rs
τr,b = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(1− Γr,b[k])(|Ik + 1
2
| − 1
2
)Rs
s.t. C1 : ρid ≤ µ
C2 : τa,r(α, β,Rs) = τr,b(α, β,Rs)
C3 : Rs > 0, α > 0, β > 0,
where constraint C2 ensures that the link selection policy is
optimal to make the exact secrecy throughput reach maximum
value.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we first derive the closed-form expressions
for above introduced performance parameters. Based on these
closed-form expressions, we re-formulate the detail optimal
problem P1 and P2 under adaptive-rate and fixed-rate trans-
mission models, respectively.
A. Performance Analysis For Adaptive-rate Transmission
Model
According the link selection scheme (9), the transmission
probability at time slot k when Alice is selected to transmit
message can be given by
ρa(α, β) = Pr[γa,r[k] ≥ max{α,
α
β
γr,b[k]}]
= Pr[γa,r[k] ≥ α
β
γr,b[k], γr,b[k] ≥ β]
+ Pr[γa,r[k] ≥ α, γr,b[k] ≤ β]
= exp
(
− α
γ¯a,r
)
−
αγ¯r,bexp
(
− αγ¯a,r −
β
γ¯r,b
)
αγ¯r,b + βγ¯a,r
.
(16)
By symmetry, we can obtain the transmission probability for
Relay
ρr(α, β) = Pr[γr,b[k] ≥ max{β,
β
α
γa,r[k]}]
= exp
(
− β
γ¯r,b
)
−
βγ¯a,rexp
(
− βγ¯r,b − αγ¯a,r
)
βγ¯a,r + αγ¯r,b
. (17)
So the probability that Relay is idle due to security consider-
ation can be presented as
7ρid(α, β) = 1− ρa(α, β)− ρr(α, β)
=
[
1− exp
(
− α
γ¯a,r
)][
1− exp
(
− β
γ¯r,b
)]
. (18)
Remark 2: According to the link selection scheme (9),
the condition min{α, β} > 2Rs − 1 is required to avoid the
decoding outage, i.e., Rs > Ra,r.
Then we derive the E2E secrecy outage probability. Based
on IV, the SOP in the first hop can be expressed as
P1so , Pr[Ca,r − Ca,e < Rs|Ik = 0]
=
Pr[max{α, αβ γr,b} < γa,r < 2Rs − 1]
ρa(α, β)
. (19)
Similarly, the SOP in the second hop is
P1so , Pr[Cr,b − Cr,e < Rs|Ik = 1]
=
Pr[max{β, βαγa,r} < γr,b < 2Rs − 1]
ρr(α, β)
(20)
substituting the p.d.f.s of γa,r,γr,b,γa,e and γa,r, the detailed
expression of P1so and P2so can be derived as (27)(28), which
are shown at the bottom of this page, respectively. Thus the
E2E SOP can be obtained based on (14).
Now we are ready to reformulate the optimal problems
about secrecy capacity and SOP. We denote the secrecy outage
capacity maximization and SOP minimization as PA1 and PA2
in adaptive-rate transmission model, respectively.
Problem PA1 is formulated as
PA1: max
α,β,Rs
Φ(α, β,Rs)
subject to C1 : ρso(α, β,Rs) ≤ µ
C2 : ρid(α, β) ≤ ν
C3 : Rs > 0,min{α, β} > 2Rs − 1,
and for Problem PA2, we have
PA2: min
α,β,Rs
Psop(α, β,Rs)
subject to C1 : Φ(α, β,Rs) ≥ θ
C2 : Pip(α, β) ≤ ν
C3 : Rs > 0,min{α, β} > 2Rs − 1,
It is notable that (27) and (28) include the transcendental
function and it’s hard to analyze the monotonicity of ρso, thus
the closed-form solutions in PA1 and PA2 are generally not
possible. Inspired by the Zoutendijk Method [43], we apply the
algorithm 3 to solve the optimal problems. before introducing
the algorithm 3, we introduce the the following lemma:
Lemma 3: Suppose the feasible point xk =
(α(k), β(k), Rs
(k)) in problem V-A has obtained after
k-th iteration, finding the strictly feasible descent direction d
at the point is equivalent to the solution the following linear
program problem:
min
d,δ
δ
s.t.

−dT∇Φ(x(k)) ≤ δ
dT∇− gi(x(k)) ≤ δ
| dj |< 0, j = 1, 2, 3
(21)
where g1(x(k)) = µ − ρso(α(k), β(k), R(k)s ), g2(x(k)) =
ν − ρid(α(k), β(k)), g3(x(k)) = (min(α(k), β(k))− 2R
(k)
s + 1)
and ∇gi(x(k)) is the first derivative of function gi(x(k)) with
respect to x(k).
Proof 5.1: According to [44] [45], d is the decline direction
of −Φ(x(k))2 if and only if −dT∇Φ(x(k)) < 0 at the point
x(k). Furthermore, if dT∇gi(x(k)) > 0 holds at x(k), d is
called the strictly feasible direction. Thus we call d as the
2the equivalent problem of maximizing Φ(x(k)) is the one of minimizing
−Φ(x(k)).Thus this paper focuses on the the feasible decline direction of
−Φ(x(k)).
P1so ,
{
2Rs r¯a,e
2Rs r¯a,e + r¯a,r
exp
(
− α
r¯a,r
− α+ 1− 2
Rs
r¯a,e2Rs
)[
1−
r¯r,b
r¯a,r
+
r¯r,b
r¯a,e2Rs
β
α +
r¯r,b
r¯a,r
+
r¯r,b
r¯a,e2Rs
exp
(
− β
r¯r,b
)]}
/ρa (27)
P2so ,
{
2Rs r¯r,e
2Rs r¯r,e + r¯r,b
exp
(
− β
r¯r,b
− β + 1− 2
Rs
r¯r,e2Rs
)[
1−
r¯a,r
r¯r,b
+
r¯a,r
r¯r,e2Rs
α
β +
r¯a,r
r¯r,b
+
r¯a,r
r¯r,e2Rs
exp
(
− α
r¯a,r
)]}
/ρr (28)
τa,r = exp
(
− α
r¯a,r
)Rs − αr¯r,bRsexp
(
− βr¯r,b
)
αr¯r,b + βr¯a,r
+ Rsr¯a,e2Rs
2Rs r¯a,e + r¯a,r
exp
(
− α
r¯a,r
− α+ 1− 2
Rs
r¯a,e2Rs
)1− ( r¯r,br¯a,r + r¯r,b2Rs r¯a,e )e−
β
r¯r,b
β
α +
r¯r,b
r¯a,r
+
r¯r,b
2Rs r¯a,e

(29)
τr,b = exp
(
− β
r¯r,b
)
(Rs −Rs βr¯a,re
− αr¯a,r
βr¯a,r + αr¯r,b
) +
Rsr¯r,e2
Rs
2Rs r¯r,e + r¯r,b
e
−( βr¯r,b+
β+1−2Rs
r¯r,e2
Rs
)
1− (βr¯a,rαr¯r,b + βr¯a,rα2Rs r¯r,e ) e− αr¯a,r
1 +
βr¯a,r
αr¯r,b
+
βr¯a,r
α2Rs r¯r,e
 (30)
8strictly feasible descent direction, if there exists δ such that
−dT∇Φ(x(k)) ≤ δ
−dT∇gi(x(k)) ≤ δ
δ < 0.
(22)
In order to find a feasible descent direction at x(k), only
need to find out d and the minimum value of δ which hold the
condition (22). | dj |≤ 1 is added to guarantee a finite optimal
solution. Thus, finding a feasible descent direction formulates
as the linear program problem (21).
The Algorithm 3 is as follows:
Algorithm 3 The Improved Feasible Direction Method
Initialization:
the initial feasible point x(0), 0 > 0 and the maximum
tolerance of objective function ε > 0, 0 =⇒ k ;
Ensure:
The optimal link selection parameters x∗
1: Step 1: Determine the effective constraint indicator set:
I(x(k), k) = {| i | 0 ≤ gi(x(k)) ≤ k, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3}, then
compute −∇Φ(x(k));
2: if I(x(k), k) = ∅ and ‖ −∇Φ(x(k)) ‖≤ ε then
3: stop iteration and x∗ = x(k);
4: else if ‖ −∇Φ(x(k)) ‖> ε then
5: set ∇Φ(x(k) = d(k), δ(k) = −1 goto Step 3;
6: else
7: goto Step 2;
8: end if
9: Step 2: Compute the linear programming problem (21),
then return d(k), δk ;
10: if δk = 0 and k < ε then
11: stop iteration and x∗ = x(k);
12: else
13: update k = k2 , goto Step 1;
14: end if
15: Step 3: One-dimensional search with direction d(k), For
i /∈ I(x(k), k), compute amax = min{ti|(gi(x(k)) +
tid
(k)) = 0, ti > 0}, then obtain ak by computing{
min− Φ(x(k) + ad(k))
0 ≤ a ≤ amax
set x(k+1) = x(k) + akd(k);
16: if ‖ x(k+1) − x(k) ‖< ε then
17: stop iteration and x∗ = x(k+1);
18: else
19: update k = k for k ≤ −δk, k = k2 for k >−δk, k = k + 1, goto Step 1.
20: end if
Because of the non-negative, ergodic and stationary process,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: When Alice transmits message to Relay with
adaptive rate, the average accept rate τa,r can be expressed as
τa,r = E{(1− Γa,r[k])(1− |Ik|)Rs}
and the detail expression is given in (29).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: From the above proof process of Lemma
2, we note the influence of the event Rs > Qr[k − 1]
is negligible. Therefore, when the link selection strategy is
optimal to maximize the secrecy outage capacity by optimizing
the scalars α and β. the secrecy outage capacity can be given
as
τr,b = E{(1− Γr,b[k])(|1
2
+ Ik| − 1
2
)Rs}
and the detail expression is given in (30).
Proof: See Appendix A. Thus the optimal problem PA3 of
maximizing the exact secrecy throughput formulates as
PA3: maximize
α,β,Rs
τr,b(α, β,Rs))
subject to C2 : ρid(α, β) ≤ ν
C3 : τa,r(α, β,Rsec) = τr,b(α, β,Rs)
C4 : 0 < Rs < Ra
C5 : min(α, β) ≥ 2Rs − 1
and the probability Alice is selected to transmit the message
is (32) at the top of the page. So the probability that Relay
keeps idle is
ρ∗id(α, β)=
1−e−
2Ra−1
γ¯a,r −e−
β
γ¯r,b+e
−( βγ¯r,b+
2Ra−1
γ¯a,r
)
α<2Ra−1
the same as (24) α≥2Ra−1
(33)
B. Performance Analysis For Fixed-rate Transmission Model
In this part, the case that Relay may not send real-time
CSI feedback and Alice transmits the message with a fixed
rate is considered. According to link selection algorithm 1,
the probability that Alice is selected to transmit the message
is
ρ∗a(α, β)= Pr[γa,r[k] ≥ max{α, 2Ra − 1,
α
β
γr,b[k]}]
=
e− 2
Ra−1
γ¯a,r −αγ¯r,be
−( 2
Ra−1
γ¯a,r
+
β(2Ra−1)
αγ¯r,b
)
αγ¯r,b+βγ¯a,r
α < 2Ra − 1
the same as (22) α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(31)
Thus when Alice transmits the data with fixed rate Ra, the
overall Psop changes to
ρso , 1− (1− P1∗so )(1− P2∗so ), (32)
where
P1∗so = Pr[Ra−Ca,e<Rs)|γa,r ≥ max(α, 2Ra−1,
αγr,b
β
)]
= Pr[Ra − log2(1 + γa,e) < Rs)]
= e
− 2Ra−Rs−1γ¯a,e , (33)
and P2∗so is (36) at the top of the page.
9Now we reformulate the optimal problem in fixed-rate trans-
mission model and denote them as PF1 and PF2, which are
counterparts of the general problem P1 and P2, respectively.
Notice that (36)-(41) are related with the relationship between
α, 2Ra−1, respectively. Hence, the optimal problem is divided
into two cases basing on the relationships between α and
2R
data
a,r − 1, the final result is obtained by comparing the two
cases.
Denoting the optimal problems as P-fix1 and P-fix2 in the
fixed-rate transmission model with channel outage feedback,
which are corresponding to P1 and P2. P-fix1 is formulated
as
PF1: maximize
α,β,Rs
Q(α, β,Rs)
subject to C1 : ρso(α, β,Rs) ≤ µ
C2 : ρid(α, β) ≤ ν
C3 : 0 < Rs < Ra
C4 : min(α, β) ≥ 2Rs − 1,
Pf2 is
PF2: minimize
α,β,Rs
ρso(α, β,Rs)
subject to C1 : Q(α, β,Rs) ≥ θ
C2 : ρid(α, β) ≤ ν
C3 : 0 < Rs < Ra
C4 : min(α, β) ≥ 2Rs − 1
As above introduced, we know that decoding outage event
never occur when Alice communicates with Relay. So τa,r is
τ∗a,r = E{Φa,r[k]Γa,r[k](1− |Ik|)Rs}
= [γa,r≥max(α, 2Ra−1,αγr,b
β
), Ra−log2(1+γa,e)≥Rs)]Rs
= ρ∗a ∗ (1− P1∗so )Rs. (41)
and τ∗r,b (41) at the top of this page. So the optimal problem
PF3 is
P-fix2: minimize
α,β,Rs
τr,b(α, β,Rs))
subject to C1 : ρid(α, β) ≤ ν
C2 : τa,r(α, β,Rs) = τr,b(α, β,Rs)
C3 : 0 < Rs < Ra
C4 : min(α, β) ≥ 2Rs − 1
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
in this section, first simulation results are given to verify
the secrecy outage probability for the proposed link selection
schemes and the theoretical derivation of maximum secrecy
outage capacity. Then we present numerical examples of the
trade-off between SOP and secrecy outage capacity for various
values of the constraints.
P∗r (α, β) = Pr[γr,b[k] ≥ max{β,
β
α
γa,r[k]}] + Pr[α < γa,r[k] < 2Ra − 1, β < γr,b[k] < β
α
γa,r[k]]
=
e− βγ¯r,b + αγ¯r,be
−( 2
Ra−1
γ¯a,r
+
β(2Ra−1)
αγ¯r,b
)
αγ¯r,b+βγ¯a,r
− e−(
β
γ¯r,b
+ 2
Ra−1
γ¯a,r
)
α < 2Ra − 1
the same as (27) α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(30)
P2∗sop = Pr[Cr,b − Cr,e < Rs|( γr,b[k] ≥ max{β,
β
α
γa,r[k]}||α < γa,r[k] < 2Ra − 1, β < γr,b[k] < β
α
γa,r[k] )]
=
{
P2sopPr + Pr[Cr,b − Cr,e < Rs, α < γa,r[k] < 2Ra − 1, β < γr,b[k] <
β
α
γa,r[k]]
}
/P ∗r
=
P2sopPr
P ∗r
+
γr,e2
Rs
P ∗r (γr,e2Rs + γr,b)
 βγa,rαγr,b + βγa,rα2Rsγr,e
1 +
βγa,r
αγr,b
+
βγa,r
α2Rsγr,e
e
−( αγa,r +
β
γr,b
+ β+1−2
Ra
2Rsγr,e
) − e−(
2Ra−1
γa,r
+ βγr,b
+ β+1−2
Ra
2Rsγr,e )
− 1
1 +
βγa,r
αγr,b
+
βγa,r
α2Rsγr,e
− e−(
2Ra−1
γa,r
+
β(2Ra−1)
αγr,b
+
β(2Ra−1)+1−2Ra
α2Rsγr,e
)
 (32)
τ∗r,b =

e
− βγ¯r,b
[
βγ¯a,r
βγ¯a,r+αγ¯r,b
e
− αγ¯a,r − e− 2
Ra−1
γ¯a,r
]
+ e
−( 2Ra−1γ¯a,r +
β(2Ra−1)
αγ¯r,b
)
[
αγ¯r,b
αγ¯r,b+βγ¯a,r
− e
−( β(2
Ra−1)−α(2Rs−1)
α2Rs γ¯r,e
)
1+
βγ¯a,r
αγ¯r,b
+
βγ¯a,r
α2Rs γ¯r,e
]
+
2Rs γ¯r,e
2Rs γ¯r,e+γ¯r,b
e
−( βγ¯r,b+
β+1−2Rs
2Rs γ¯r,e
)
[
e
− 2Ra−1γ¯a,r −
βγ¯a,r
αγ¯r,b
+
βγ¯a,r
α2Rs γ¯r,e
1+
βγ¯a,r
αγ¯r,b
+
βγ¯a,r
α2Rs γ¯r,e
e
− αγ¯a,r
]
α < 2Ra − 1
the same with (35) α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(36)
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Fig. 4. Theoretical and simulated End-to-End SOP performance vs. the target
secrecy capacity Rs. Case 1: adaptive-rate transmission model. Case 2: Fixed-
rate Transmission model.
A. Simulation Settings and Validation
For the validation of our theoretical framework, we devel-
oped a specific C++ simulator to simulate the system model
described in Section II and link selection schemes under
adaptive-rate and fixed-rate transmission models. Without los-
ing generality, in every below simulations, all noise variance
and transmission powers are normalized to unity, and we set
the average channel gains of Alice-Relay, Relay-Bob, Alice-
Eve and Relay-Eve channels as 5dB, 10dB, 0dB and 2dB,
respectively. The duration of each task of simulation is set to
be 1× 108 time slots.
Fig.7 compares the theoretical and simulated values of
the End-to-End secrecy outage performance for two network
scenarios. In order to void the decoding outage (i.e., Rs is
beyond the transmission rate), we respectively set α = 7.0
and β = 8.0 for adaptive-rate transmission. For fixed-rate
transmission, we consider two cases (Case 1: adaptive-rate
transmission model. Case 2 fixed-rate transmission model:α <
2Ra − 1 and Ra = 4.0, case 2:α ≥ 2Ra − 1 and Ra = 3.0).
We can see from Fig.7 that the simulation results essentially
perfectly match with the theoretical ones. It is clearly shown
that case 2 in fixed-rate has the worst outage performance and
the case 1 in fixed-rate has the best.
B. Adaptive-rate Transmission Performance Discussion
In Figure 8, the secrecy outage capacity versus the desired
End-to-End SOP constraint for the proposed scheme and
link optimal Policy [20] is shown. In order to reveal the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we consider different
eavesdropping channel conditions (γ¯a,e = 0, 10 dB) in first
hop. Figure 8 shows that a higher SOP results in a larger
secrecy outage capacity as expected in general for both the
proposed scheme and link optimal policy. No matter the
equality of the eavesdropping channel in first hop is weak of
strong, The proposed link scheme outperforms the link optimal
policy. The latter only considers the transmission security in
second hop and gives higher priority to select the Alice-relay
link with respect to the proposed scheme, so that the buffer
queue is at the absorbing state as much as possible.
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Figure 9 illustrates the End-to-End SOP versus secrecy out-
age capacity for different wiretap channel conditions between
different schemes. It can be observed that the proposed scheme
achieves better secrecy performance under both weak and
strong qualities of the wiretap channel. More interesting is that
the secrecy outage performance improves more significantly
with γ¯a,e = 10 dB, it is because that the proposed scheme
considers both two wiretap links and the choice of α, β has
more flexibility. When Alice-Eve link has higher quality, α
takes bigger value accordingly and the relay-Bob link is given
priority to be selected relatively.
Figure 10 illustrates the exact secrecy throughput versus the
probability that the relay keeps idol for different channel gains
in second hop. It can be seen that the channel gain in second
hop has a positive impact on the secrecy throughput. It is due
to the reason that the higher channel gain brings the higher
transmission rate and higher rate redundancy, the average num-
ber of bits is bigger from the secrecy data in buffer queue of
relay to Bob. Thus the exact secrecy throughput from Alice to
Bob has bigger value. Another very interesting observation is
that relaxing constraint about the idol probability has positive
impact on secrecy throughput, which means that Alice and
relay are required to transmit the data as much as possible, but
the average number of secrecy data that Bob receives is less.
This is due to the reason that the effects of secrecy throughput
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between different link schemes.
are two folds. On one hand, the small value of idol probability
implies higher transmission probabilities for Alice and relay,
the probability that the data is intercepted by eavesdropper
become higher in dual hops, which leads to the lower secrecy
data number both at relay and Bob; on the other hand, a lower
idol probability restricts the smaller value ranges of the link
selection thresholds α and β and the value of the secrecy
throughput is related with the value of α and β.
C. Fixed-rate Transmission Performance Discussion
Figure 11 depicts the secrecy outage capacity versus the
desired End-to-End SOP constraint for the proposed scheme
and link optimal Policy in case 2. As expected in general,
the secrecy outage capacity increases with the value of SOP
growing. Interestingly, for both weak and strong channel
quality of the Alice-relay link, we proposed scheme precedes
the link optimal policy. Compared with case 1 Figure 8, we
see that the secrecy outage capacity performance decreases
sharply with the same SOP constraint. Different from case 1,
Alice transmits data with fixed-rate Ra in case 2, which leads
to the higher SOP in first hop.
In Figure 12, we depict the tradeoff between the End-to-
End SOP versus secrecy outage capacity with γ¯a,e=0, 10 dB
under different link selection schemes. It can be seen that the
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transmission model.
secrecy performance is worse under more stringent secrecy
outage capacity constraint. Similarly, the proposed link selec-
tion scheme is superior to the link optimal policy, especially
when the eavesdropping channel has better quality in the
first hop. Considering the Rayleigh fading effect, the fixed-
rate transmission model is always inferior to adaptive-rate
transmission model.
Figure 13 depicts the exact secrecy throughput versus idol
probability in case 2 (i.e., fixed-rate transmission), where the
final results is obtained by comparing two cases, i.e., α <
2Ra − 1 and α ≥ 2Ra − 1. The curves for γ¯r,b = 5, 8, 10
dB show the higher quality of relay-Bob channel results in
higher secrecy throughput when ν < 0.1, which implies that
the delay sensitive network (such as disaster relief and military
networks) should give the higher priority when relay-Bob link
is higher channel quality but the delay insensitive network
should give lower priority.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper considers a two-hop buffer-aided relay network
where both the source and relay can be wiretapped by an
external eavesdropper. Considering the transmission security
of dual hops, we proposed different link selection schemes
for different transmission models, which take into account
the non-availability of eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI. The
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link selection decision thresholds are optimal to maximize and
minimize the secrecy outage capacity and SOC, respectively.
In view of the impact that relay keeps idol on exact secrecy
throughput, we study the trade-off between them.Various nu-
merical studies have demonstrated the proposed link scheme
provides significant performance improvement in dual hop
eavesdropping network in terms of secrecy outage capacity,
secrecy outage probability and exact secrecy throughput.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Denoting the p.d.f.s of γ¯a,r, γ¯r,b and γ¯a,e as fα(γ¯α), fr(γ¯r)
and fe(γ¯e), respectively.
τa,r = E{Φa,r[k]Γa,r[k](1− |Ik|)}Rs
= Pr[log2
1 + γ¯a,r
1 + γ¯a,e
≥ Rs, γ¯a,r ≥ max(α, α
β
γ¯r,b)]
= Pr[γ¯a,r ≥ max{α, 2Rs(1 + γ¯a,e)− 1}, γ¯r,b < β]
+ Pr[γ¯a,r ≥ max{α
β
γ¯r,b, 2
Rs(1 + γ¯a,e)− 1}, γ¯r,b ≥ β]
=
∫ β
0
∫ α+1−2Rs2Rs
0
∫ ∞
α
+
∫ ∞
α+1−2Rs
2Rs
∫ ∞
2Rs (1+γ¯a,e)

fα(γ¯α)fe(γ¯e)fr(γ¯r)dγ¯αdγ¯edR¯sγr
+
∫ ∞
β
∫ ∞
α
β γ¯r,b
∫ αβ γ¯r,b+1
2Rs
−1
0
+
∫ ∞
α
β
γ¯r,b+1
2Rs
−1
∫ ∞
2Rs (1+γ¯a,e)−1

fe(γ¯e)fα(γ¯α)fr(γ¯r)dγ¯edγ¯αdγ¯r
= u(α, β,Rs) + v(α, β,Rs), (42)
where
u(α, β,Rs) = e
− αγ¯a,r (1− e−
β
γ¯r,b )
1− 2Rs γ¯a,ee 2Rs−α−1γ¯a,e2Rs
γ¯a,r + 2Rs γ¯a,e
 ,
(43)
and
v(α, β,Rs) =
βγ¯a,r
βγ¯a,r + αγ¯r,b
e
−( βγ¯r,b+
α
γ¯a,r
)
=
γ¯a,e2
Rs
γ¯a,e2Rs + γ¯a,r
e
−( αγ¯a,r +
β
γ¯r,b
+α+1−2
Rs
γ¯a,e2
Rs
)
1 +
αγ¯r,b
βγ¯a,r
+
αγ¯r,b
β2Rs γ¯a,e
. (44)
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